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Abstract 
Ethiopia‘s Justice System Reform Program has not achieved the pledges that were 
promised since 2002. One of the sources for the impediments was ‗revolutionary 
democracy‘ because its ‗democratic‘ limb represented the pursuits of justice system 
reform while its ‗revolutionary‘ limb caused impediments to the reform. This 
involves various manifestations of ‗revolutionary democracy‘ which include 
institutional discontinuity, ethnic politics and reluctance to land reform.  Disruptions 
owing to periodic changes in institutional structures (and mandates) adversely affect 
institutional memory and continuity in Ethiopia‘s justice system reform. The second 
impediment relates to problems in law and order owing to the risky experiment in 
ethnic politics that has nurtured ethnic radicalism and hostilities along linguistic 
lines thereby creating pressures on the justice sector. It has also impeded attainments 
in the first two dimensions of good governance, (i.e. voice and accountability) 
because genuine voice of citizens envisages rational choice as opposed to ethnicity. 
The third trap which is among the manifestations of ‗revolutionary democracy‘ 
involves rigidity against reforming Ethiopia‘s land law which has handcuffed broad-
based economic performance thereby impairing the resource base of all reform 
pursuits (including justice system reform). The way forward thus envisages not only 
addressing the external manifestations of the problems in the justice system, but also 
requires directly addressing the root causes of the impediments.   
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The concept of ‗Revolutionary Democracy‘ is affiliated to Vladimir I. Lenin‘s 
‗New Democratic Revolution‘ (NDR). For Lenin, NDR meant an interim phase 
toward socialism and communism. According to Lenin, the victory of ―a 
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry‖ will 
enable the communist party ―to rouse Europe, and the socialist proletariat of 
Europe‖.1 On the contrary, ‗Revolutionary Democracy‘ in post-1991 Ethiopia 
embodied contradictory meanings, because it claimed to represent ‗economic 
and political liberalization‘ in official discourse, while it was clearly within the 
ambit of Marxist-Leninist thinking in political party operations and party-state 
relations.  
It was in the midst of such inherent contradiction in the concept of 
‗revolutionary democracy‘ that achievements were attained in the formulation of 
the 2002 Justice System Reform Program (JSRP) and the 2005 Comprehensive 
Justice System Reform Program (CJSRP).2 The ‗democratic‘ limb of 
revolutionary democracy facilitated the formulation of the 2002 JSRP and the 
2005 Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program, and on the contrary, its 
‗revolutionary‘ limb (caused by the Marxist heritage of the political leadership) 
was incongruent with most parts of JSRP‘s and CJSRP‘s recommendations. The 
cutbacks in the pace of justice system reform were apparent in 2005/2006 
(immediately after the 2005 elections) and from 2007 onward under pledges of 
‗democratic developmental statehood‘.  
There was indeed optimism that the attention given to justice sector reform 
during the formulation of the program would be sustained in its implementation 
phases as well. However, sixteen years after the take-off towards Justice System 
Reform Programme in 20023, Ethiopia‘s justice sector has regressed4, and this 
can be verified by the facts that were officially admitted (after the 2018 political 
                                           
1
 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1905), Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic 
Revolution, Collected Works, 1962, Vol. 9, (Translation:  Abraham Fineburg and Julius 
Katzer), pp. 15-140, Section 10: ―Revolutionary Communes‖ and the Revolutionary-
Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry. 
2
 The Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program Baseline Study Report, Ministry of 
Capacity Building, Justice System Reform Program Office, February 2005. 
3
 Ministry of Capacity Building, Justice System Reform in Ethiopia: Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Ethiopia’s Justice System Reform, Africa Hall, 7-8 May 2002. 
4
 For details on the regression in the pace of justice sector reform programmes see two 
articles by this author published in Mizan Law Review, Volume 9, No. 2,  titled ―Judicial 
Reform Pursuits in Ethiopia, 2002-2015: Steady Concrete Achievements - versus - 
Promise Fatigue‖ (pp. 215-257), http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v9i2.1   and  ―Legal 
Sector Reform Pursuits in Ethiopia: Gaps in Grassroots Empowerment‖ (pp. 258-
300), http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v9i2.2 
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reforms) regarding the unconstitutional acts of various law enforcement 
institutions. Steadily declining public trust in the justice sector (i.e., the legal 
and judicial sectors) renders the discourse on justice sector reform as relevant 
and expedient today as it was in 2002. This article focuses on certain themes 
that are relevant in the way forward towards the reinvigoration of the 2002 and 
2005 aspirations which, inter alia, require dealing with impediments of reform. 
Section 1 presents an overview of institutional discontinuity in Ethiopia‘s 
justice sector during the last decades, and Section 2 discusses the current 
pursuits in law reform and the resumption of justice system reform projects. The 
third and fourth sections deal with the problems of institutional discontinuity in 
the coordination of the justice system reform program and in relation to trends 
of scrapping codes of law in the name of revision. Sections 5 and 6 respectively 
highlight the nexus between good governance and justice sector reform, and the 
tension between good governance and ethnic politics.  Based on these themes, 
Sections 7 to 10 highlight four challenges in justice sector effectiveness in the 
context of ethnic politics. The themes are: law compliant citizenship, peace and 
order in the context of diversity, the tension between multi-ethnic civic identity 
and Article 39 of the FDRE Constitution, and the constitutionality debate 
regarding the emblem on the Ethiopian flag.  Sections 11 and 12 respectively 
deal with the need for land reform and normative gate keeping against predatory 
statehood.   
1. Overview of Institutional Discontinuity in Ethiopia’s Post-
1931 Laws and Justice Sector  
Ethiopia‘s 1931 Constitution was a significant achievement in lawmaking. The 
reformers of the period (who were regarded as Japanizers) sought modernization 
and progress.5 Another significant landmark in legal development was the 
Negarit Gazeta which began to be promulgated in March 1942. In spite of its 
slow pace, justice sector institution building (including the legal regime) 
continued, and the attainments included the 1955 Revised Constitution. A major 
achievement in this regard relates to the codification of six codes of law –from 
1957 to 1965– and the establishment of Faculty of Law at Haile Selassie I 
University (currently Addis Ababa University) in 1963. These achievements 
resulted from the modernization thinking of the period and the belief in a legal 
system‘s instrumental function in development.   
The 1960 Civil Code and Commercial Code had envisaged facilitating the 
modernization of Ethiopia through the path undergone by the Global North 
                                           
5
 See, for example, Bahru Zewde (2002). Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist 
Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century (J. Currey Publisher). 
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through reception of their institutions including laws. However, legal institutions 
cannot be regarded as mere results of political will. Nor can the law be regarded 
as a stand-alone toolkit for social engineering. Indeed, progress in the legal 
regime and justice sector institutions has a bi-directional relationship with the 
corresponding social and economic realities that render a rational legal system 
and justice sector expedient, and at the same time facilitate its development, 
implementation, outcomes and impact.  
Unfortunately, however, Ethiopia‘s pace of nation-building and legal 
development (in 1942-1974) failed to catch up with unfolding realities on 
various fronts, which include: (i) land reform, (ii) constitutional reforms that, 
inter alia ensure equality in religion and ethnic identity, (iii) reform towards 
constitutional monarchy, and (iv) the accommodation of federalism in Eritrea in 
accordance with the UN General Assembly‘s Resolution, rendered in 1950.6   
In addition to these domestic problems, the global economic system brought 
about widening gaps in balance of trade in developing countries accompanied 
by the global oil crisis during the early 1970s. As the regime failed to address 
the domestic challenges and the effects of the 1973/74 global oil crisis, promises 
of reform in Mid-1974 including a draft constitution toward constitutional 
monarchy7 seemed to be too-little-too-late after the 1974 revolution.  
There were indeed lost opportunities in land reform, nation-state building and 
institutional development (including the justice sector) which include the 
absolute monarchy‘s failure to reform itself during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
There was a similar failure to learn from models of pragmatic reform (such as 
the South Korean path) that could have been adopted upon the advent of the 
Dergue to power in September 1974. Such options could have been conducive 
to incremental and steady institutional reforms (including the justice sector) 
thereby facilitating institutional continuity in the organic improvement of 
lawmaking, court systems, law enforcement, law practice and legal education.  
In contrast to the modernization theory which was reflected in the legal 
development pursuits of the 1960s, communism –that was tailored to the 19th 
century realities of England, France and Germany– informed policies in 
Ethiopia from 1975 until the late 1980s. Analogous to the attempts to revise the 
1955 Constitution toward constitutional monarchy in 1974, the economic reform 
pledges of the late 1980s were eleventh-hour attempts. It is to be recalled that a 
request for mixed economy by Col. Atnafu Ababte was unduly suppressed in 
September-October 1977. Even worse, the Dergue was too rigid to consider a 
political solution (such as federation) to Eritrea.  
                                           
6
 UN General Assembly‘s Resolution 390-A(V), 2 December 1950. 
7
 See, for example, New York Times, 7 August 1974, p. 38. ―A New Constitution offered in 
Ethiopia‖, citing AP, August 6, 1974.  
 
Ethiopia‘s Justice System Reform at Crossroads: Impediments …                                     263 
 
 
Even though the land reform of 19758 was a positive achievement, its 
extremely radical content was incongruent with Marx‘s views (whose ideology 
was pledged to be pursued), because Karl Marx (1818-1883) did not envisage 
nationalization of the means of production before the attainment of the capitalist 
mode of production. According to Marx, socialized production and private 
appropriation reach at a stage of an irreconcilable contradiction under an 
advanced level of capitalism. He argued that ―scattered private property arising 
from individual labour‖ is transformed ―into capitalist private property‖ and he 
considered this as ―the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few 
usurpers‖.9 Based on this premise, Marx envisaged ―the transformation of 
capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialized production, 
into socialized property‖.10 For Marx, this constitutes ―the expropriation of a 
few usurpers by the mass of the people‖.11 
At hindsight, it can be observed that Ethiopia‘s 1975 land reform could have 
benefited from pragmatism and reason –as was the case in South Korea– and 
this would have enabled the appropriate balance between equity (distributive 
justice) and economic efficiency. Ethiopia‘s 1975 land reform solely focused on 
distributive justice, and this has ultimately brought about land fragmentation 
and shared impoverishment.  Farm size steadily declined owing to Ethiopia‘s 
rising population and the slow pace in the transition to manufacturing-led 
economy. According to a 2015 study by FAO, Ethiopia‘s ―average small farm 
size is 0.9 hectares‖12, and the study indicates the decline in average small farm 
size ―from 1.43 hectares in 1977 to 1.03 in 2000‖.13  
For example, the nationalization of modern farms (owned and managed by 
professionals and entrepreneurs) in 1975 merely led to state farms that were 
largely bankrupt and subsidized. Moreover, exceptions could have been made to 
room rentals in urban house compounds as long as the parcel size did not exceed 
the maximum (i.e. 500 sq. meters) that was allowed in the 1975 Urban Land and 
Extra Houses Proclamation.14  However, the rush of the Marxists –during the 
                                           
8
 Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation No. 31/1975. 
9
 Karl Marx (1867), (English Translation, 1887, by Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling), 
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, Book One: The Process of Production 
of Capital, Chapter 32, ―Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation‖, Progress 






 George Rapsomanikis (2015), The economic lives of smallholder farmers: An analysis 
based on household data from nine countries (Food and Agricultural Organization of the 




 Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses Proclamation No. 47/1975. 
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period– was to avoid the tag of ‗revisionism‘. Thus, pragmatic options of land 
reform (such as abolition of tenancy and ensuring tenure security  to smallholder 
farmers, compensation to former landowners with exceptions stated by law, etc) 
would not have been acceptable to the Ethiopian left. An ideology that emerged 
as an anti-thesis against a fully developed capitalist mode of production was 
imported dogmatically to a predominantly agrarian Ethiopia of the Mid 1970s. 
With regard to the judiciary (in 1974-1991), there were extra-judicial 
interventions such as military tribunals. But these interventions did not involve 
simulations thereby leaving the judiciary to operate –on its own– in commercial, 
civil, tax and non-political criminal cases. Even though ordinary courts were 
recognized as the only judicial organs under the 1987 People‘s Democratic 
Republic Ethiopia (PDRE) Constitution, a military tribunal was established 
against the leaders of the coup that was attempted in May 1989. The executive 
was thus resorting to such tribunals whenever it needed intervention, and it did 
not need a façade of ‗show trials‘ through the ordinary courts.  
However, special tribunals outside ordinary courts are not formally possible 
after 1991 owing to the pledges of constitutional democracy and separation of 
powers. During this period, executive intervention in judicial matters could only 
be done through the ordinary courts which eventually became a modus operandi 
in many benches. Eventually, the level of political intervention (in 2017, for 
example) included the act of gathering judges and court staff for sessions that 
were known as ‗renewal‘ and ‗deep renewal‘ (‗tehadiso’ and ‗tilq tehadiso‘). 
Although courts are declared to be independent under Article 79 of the FDRE 
Constitution, there was apparent intervention of the executive (and the political 
leadership) because ‗revolutionary democracy‘ influenced the policy framework 
(including the justice system). 
2. Current Pursuits in Law Reform and Justice System Reform 
Projects 
2.1 Pursuits of law reform 
There is an initiative toward law reforms by the Federal Attorney General. To 
this end, it had organized a workshop conducted on June 6, 2018. As noted 
during a presentation at the workshop, there are problems and limitations in the 
justice sector,15 which include: 
a) deterioration in the quality of laws, 
b) absence of a forum that facilitates consistent and meaningful consultation, 
c) absence of a scheme that can be used to analyze the extent to which laws are 
just, effective and viable,  
                                           
15
 Dr. Mulugeta Mengist, Presentation at the Consultative Workshop on Problems in 
Ethiopia‘s Justice conducted at Capital Hotel, June 6, 2018. 
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d) the erroneous view which unduly strives to discard laws merely because they 
were enacted some decades ago (የቆየ ይፍረስ የሚሌ አሠራር) while older codes of 
laws in Europe are still operative, and 
e) problems related to independence and effectiveness.  
According to Dr. Mulugeta, the problems in the justice sector are, inter alia, 
attributable to ―abrupt switch to different tracks (such as BPR) analogous to 
being carried away with new songs (ያዝ ሇቀቅ፣ እንዯአዱስ ዗ፈን), and ―lack of forum for 
consultation, discourse and analysis‖. He also noted the ―gaps in the 
institutionalization of achievements and performance, and gaps in institutional 
memory.‖ Moreover he indicated other factors such as the historical context and 
―the internal operations and structures of justice sector institutions.‖ 16 
The workshop aimed at facilitating discussion on issues of concern in 
Ethiopia‘s justice sector. As Attorney General Birhanu Tsegaye stated, an 
Advisory Council has been established, and it is entrusted with the task of 
presenting ―proposals on certain laws that are believed to narrow the political 
space in order for the government to make amendments‖ which include the anti-
terrorism and the charities and societies proclamations.17 ―The Council is 
conducting studies to make sure whether the existing laws [comply] with the 
Constitution‖ with a view to ―improving the justice system, ensuring the rights 
of citizens and broadening the political space‖.18 The Council‘s Chairperson, 
Professor Tilahun Teshome, has likewise expressed the need for justice sector 
reform in order to ensure rule of law, peace and development.19 
Dr. Gedion Timothewos, Coordinator of the Research Team on the Anti-
terrorism Proclamation, stated that the Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory 
Council has adopted a roadmap for three years, based on research. He also 
pointed out that in addition to the workshops and panel discussions, ―platforms 
will be created to incorporate the views and ideas of political party leaders, 
journalists, prosecutors and lawyers‖.20  
2.2 The JLRTI study towards resuming justice system reform projects 
Justice and Legal Research and Training Institute (JLRTI) is expected to resume 
the projects under the Justice System Reform Program based on its mandate 
under Proclamation No. 1071/2018. The Federal Supreme Court, Federal 








 Professor Tilahun Teshome, Addis Ababa University, School of Law, Fana Broadcasting, 
August 18, 2018.   
20
 Ethiopian News Agency, August 18, 2018. Dr. Gedion Timothewos, Addis Ababa 
University, School of Law. 
266                              MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 12, No.2                             December 2018 
 
 
Attorney General, Justice and Legal Research and Training Institute, and Higher 
Education Strategy Center have conducted a joint study with regard to the gaps 
in the pace and attainments of the justice system reform sub-programs that were 
formulated under the 2005 Justice System Reform Program. These studies were 
compiled under the auspices of Justice and Legal Research and Training 
Institute (JLRTI) and were presented as a joint study by presenters from the 
respective justice sector institutions at the Joined-up Justice Forum workshop in 
Adama on August 28, 2018.21   
The introduction of the joint study22 by justice sector institutions (hereinafter 
referred to as the JLRTI Study) recalls the level of attention that was given to 
the Justice System Reform Program during the initial years, and it highlights the 
factors that contributed to the decline in the pace of its effective implementation. 
The study indicates the transfer of the coordination task [from the Justice 
System Reform Program Office at the Ministry of Capacity Building] to Justice 
and Legal System Research Institute (JLSRI) in 2005/2006. It appreciates the 
achievements (during the coordination by JLSRI) in the field of legal education 
reform which includes the development and implementation of a new LLB 
Programme curriculum and academic staff capacity development pursuits.  
However, it notes that the attainments in the judicial and law enforcement sub-
programs of the 2005 Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program were 
inadequate after the coordination function was transferred to JLSRI. 
According to the study, there was further regression in the Justice System 
Reform Program after JLSRI ceased to coordinate the program due to the 
decision of functional rearrangements that led to the fragmented implementation 
of the sub-programs [since 2010/11]. The regression in justice system reform 
program continued further because it was ultimately subsumed under general 
themes such as good governance after the task of coordination was transferred to 
the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resources Development.23  
Part Four of the study deals with analysis and findings that relate to the three 
sub-programs under Ethiopia‘s justice sector reform (i.e. sub-programs for 
                                           
21 የፌዳራሌ የፍትሕና ሕግ ምርምርና ሥሌጠና ኢንስቲትዩት፤ ፍትሕ ሥርዓት ማሻሻያ ኘሮግራም በፌዳራሌ 
ተቋማት ያሇበትን ዯረጃ ሇመሇየት የተካሄዯ ዲሰሳዊ ጥናት፤ነሏሴ 2010 ዓ.ም፣ አዱስ አበባ፡፡ [Federal Justice and 
Legal Research and Training Institute, Assessment of the Status of Justice System Reform Program 
in Federal Institutions, August 2018, Addis Ababa] 
22
 Id., pp. 4, 5. 
23
 የትምህርትና ሥሌጠናውን የትምህርት ሚኒስቴር (የትምህርት ስትራቴጂ ማዕከሌ)፤ የሕግ ምርምር ሥራውን 
የፍትሕና ሕግ ሥርዓት ምርምር ኢንስቲትዩት፤ የሥራ ሊይ ሥሌጠናውን የፌዳራሌ የፍትሕ አካሊት ባሇሙያዎች 
ማሠሌጠኛ ማዕከሌ፤ የፍርዴ ቤቱን የፌዳራሌ ጠቅሊይ ፍርዴ ቤት እንዱሁም የሕግ አስከባሪውን ዯግሞ በፍትሕ 
ማስከበር ሥራው ሊይ የተሠማሩ ተቋማት  በተናጠሌ እንዱያከናውኑ ሲዯረግ የቅንጅት ሥራው በጣም ተዲክሟሌ፡፡  
ከዓመታት በኃሊ ፕሮግራሙን የማስተባበር ሚናው ሇፐብሉክ ሰርቪስና የሰው ሀብት ሚኒስቴር ቢሰጥም ሚኒስቴር 
መ/ቤቱ ከላሊ የሇውጥ ሥራዎችና መሌካም አስተዲዯር ጋር በማቀሊቀሌ የማሻሻያ ፕሮግራሙ ይ዗ት እንዱጠፋ 
አስተዋጽኦ አዴርጓሌ፡፡  (Id., page 5) 
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judicial reform, law enforcement reform and legal education). It discusses the 
goals that were attained (during the period between 2003 to 2010 Ethiopian 
Calendar, i.e. 2010/11 to 2017/18) among the planned activities under 54 
projects,24 the activities that were not performed under each sub-program, the 
challenges encountered, the tasks that have become regular tasks, and good 
practices.  
The fifth part states the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the 
study.  The gaps stated in the findings include the following: 
– there are ―problems and public concerns in service provision and good 
governance with regard to the  registrar [and] judicial decisions …‖;25 
– the measure of subsuming justice system reform program under the Ministry 
of Public Service was not effective;26 
– draft laws are not mostly based on research; there is failure to comply with 
the procedures of legislative drafting; and the quality of various legislative 
drafts is low;27 
– there are gaps in the quality of charges submitted to courts and in the levels 
of skills and diligence with regard to public prosecution services;  
–  ―there were violations committed by prison warders and administrative 
office holders  in the treatment and respect of the human rights of 
prisoners;‖ 28 
– the problems in law schools include admission of students with low national 
exam results, shortage of law school teaching staff, inadequate networking 
between justice sector institutions and legal education, absence of pedagogy 
training to newly recruited law teachers, and shortage of teaching 
materials;29 
– there is the problem of ―opening of law schools in large numbers without 
due attention to standards thereby resulting in a steady decline in the quality 
of legal education.30 
                                           
24
 ―እነዚህን ንዑስ ፕሮግራሞች ሇማሳካት እንዱቻሌ ሇፍርዴ ቤቶች ማሻሻያ 16፤ ሇሕግ አስከባሪ 30 እና ሇሕግ 
ትምህርት ሥሌጠናና ምርምር ማጠናከሪያ 8 በአጠቃሊይ 54 ፕሮጀክቶች ተግባራዊ እንዯሚዯረጉ በዕቅደ 
ተመሌክቷሌ፡፡‖ [The plan indicates 16 projects for judicial reform, 30 projects for law 
enforcement reform 8 projects for legal education reform, i.e. a total of 54 projects]. Id., 
page 25.    
25  Id., page 136.    
26
 Id. p. 140. 
27
 Id., p. 141. 
28
 Id. p. 144. 
29
 Id. pp. 146-147. 
30
 Id. p. 147. 
― የሕግ ትምህርት ቤቶች (ትምህርት ክፍልች) በብዛት መከፈታቸው ያሇምንም ስታንዲርዴ ከመሆኑ ጋር ተያይዞ 
የትምህርት ጥራት ከጊዜ ወዯ ጊዜ እያሽቆሇቆሇ [ሄዷሌ፡፡]‖ 
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The study notes the gaps in the institutional framework towards coordination 
and harmonization of justice sector reform that have adversely affected the 
achievements in the sector: 
―Most [justice sector] institutions do not have offices or professionals in 
charge of justice system reform activities.  Justice and Legal Research and 
Training Institute does not have an office with a professional staff that is 
specifically designated to conduct the justice system reform activities at 
required level. There was no institution that follows up, evaluates and 
supports justice sector institutions in the course of their plans and 
achievements [in their respective sub-programs]. While most of the project 
activities were being conducted as ordinary functions, some projects are not 
performed due to shortages in finance and manpower‖.31   
The study further states recommendations for the various entities that are in 
charge of the sub-programs on judicial reform, law enforcement, and legal 
education. The recommendations of the JLRTI Study with regard to the judicial 
reform sub-program32 include the following: 
a) due attention to the level of satisfaction of judicial service recipients, 
stakeholders and lawyers and to public trust, in addition to the focus courts 
have hitherto given to internal operations and institutional arrangements;  
b) identify barriers that impede the enhancement of public satisfaction and 
trust;  
c) ensure that statements of claims/charges, statements of defence, memoranda 
of appeal, etc., fulfil the requirements under the laws of procedure (both in 
content and form); 
d) the independence of courts accompanied by neutrality and accountability;  
e) ensuring the independence and neutrality of courts including their 
empowerment to prepare their annual budget and to submit it to the House 
of Peoples Representatives; 
f) executing a system (beyond the exchange of reports) that facilitates in-depth 
follow up, analysis and evaluation of implementation in the judicial reform 
sub-program; 
g)  staff engagement and motivation by going beyond the minor improvements 
in operations, service provision and human resource development that have 
accrued from previous instruments;  
h) enhancing the consistency and predictability of sentences in criminal cases; 
i) provision of residential facilities to judges, implementation of the draft 
salary scale for judges, and facilitating their academic development;   
j) pursuance of the projects of reform that are underway;  
                                           
31
 Id. p. 145. 
32
 Id. pp. 148-150. 
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k) strengthening the activities that were part of the judicial reform sub-program 
and that have now been classified as ordinary activities; and 
l)  initiating new projects that bring about judicial reform through tools that 
facilitate concrete and visible performance towards achieving the projects of 
judicial reform.  
The recommendations in the JLRTI study with regard to the law enforcement 
sub-program33  include: 
– human resource development, awareness enhancement and motivation 
schemes; 
– the need for urgent reform in management and staffing at training centres 
(including the police and prison administration); 
–  adequate budget to enhance the number and skills of researchers in the 
justice sector; 
– support to and follow up of the law revision activities that are underway; 
– schemes of support to encourage Alternative Dispute Resolution; 
– the need for alternative punishment to avoid overcrowding of prisons which 
weakens the efforts of reform and rehabilitation in prisons; and  
– strategies and directives that can facilitate the effective implementation of 
Ethiopia‘s Crime Prevention Policy.  
The JLRTI study condemns human rights violations against detained 
suspects due to improper investigation (ያሌተገባ የምርመራ ተግባር). It states the need 
for the enhancement of technology, proper training in investigation, forensic 
labs and services, forensic pathology and forensic psychiatry, and enhanced 
public awareness about crimes. It also underlines the need for ―prohibitive and 
deterrent measures against persons who conduct improper investigation against 
suspects who are under custody‖34 and demands the ―provision of clean lodging, 
adequate healthcare and adequate food to suspects under custody as much as 
possible‖.35 To this end, the study calls for harmonized pursuits among all 
justice sector institutions.36 
                                           
33
 Id. pp. 150-156. 
34 ―በሕግ ጥሊ ሥር በቁጥጥር የሚገኙ ተጠርጣሪዎች ሊይ ያሌተገባ የምርመራ ተግባራትን የሚፈጽሙ መርማሪዎች 
ሊይ ተገቢውን የማያዲግም እርምጃ በመውሰዴ ከዴርጊታቸው እንዱታቀቡ እና ላልች እንዱማሩበት ማዴረግ፣‖ 
35 ―በወንጀሌ ተጠርጥረው በሕግ ጥሊ ሥር ሊለ ተጠርጣሪዎች አቅም በፈቀዯ መጠን ንፁህ  የማረፊያ ቦታ፣ በቂ የሆነ 
የሕክምና እና የምግብ አቅርቦት የሚያገኙበትን ሁኔታ ማመቻቸት፣‖ 
36
 Id., p. 153.   
   ―ቅንጅታዊ አሠራር ማጠናከር በፍትሕ ሴክተሩ የሚታዩት ችግሮች በየዯረጃው መፍትሔ በመስጠት በሕገ መንግሥቱ 
ከሴክተሩ የሚጠበቁትን ኃሊፊነቶች እንዱወጣ ሇማዴረግና ሇፍትሕ ሴክተሩ እቅዴ ሇማሳካት የቅንጅት አሠራር ወሳኝ 
ነው፡፡ በመሆኑም፦ አሁን እየታየ ያሇው አሠራር በዝቅተኛ ዯረጃ ሊይ ያሇና የኅብረተሰቡን ፍሊጎት መሠረት ያሊዯረገ 
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With regard to the legal education reform sub-program,37 the study, inter 
alia, calls for ―staff development in post graduate and PhD programmes, 
pedagogy training, formulation of a system that implements admission exam to 
legal education in addition to the exit exam that is underway, and sustained 
review and updating of curriculum.‖ Moreover, it underlines the need for 
―incentives to academics toward preparing and publishing law textbooks and 
incentive schemes to legal research and its implementation‖. 
Various cross-cutting recommendations in the JLRTI study are stated under 
the law enforcement sub-program. The need to give due focus to the availability 
of required facilities are stated among the recommendations of the study.38 
Moreover, the study notes the gaps in the justice sector with regard to 
harmonization, and calls for coordinated and harmonized activities because the 
level of operations in the justice sector is currently low and not in tandem with 
the needs of the public, thereby necessitating enhanced and harmonized modes 
of operations.39     
The recommendations in the study further state the need for mechanisms that 
ensure legal aid through the enhanced participation of practicing lawyers and 
law schools, and for the representation of the indigent who should receive pro 
bono services in their claims of compensation as victims of serious crimes and 
human rights violations. With regard to professional associations, the study 
indicates the need for strengthening associations in the legal profession, and it 
states their prospective role in the efforts toward solving the problems in the 
justice sector. To this end, the study, inter alia, calls for due attention to a legal 
framework and a coherent institutional arrangement.40   
Cross-cutting recommendations (in the section on law enforcement sub-
program) include the enhancement of ICT and due attention to the effective and 
efficient legal information flow though the completion of the National 
Integrated Justice Information System /NIJIS (ብሔራዊ የተቀናጀ የፍትሕ ተቋማት መረጃ 
ሥርዓት) project that has taken a long time. The Cross-cutting recommendations41 
(that are stated under the legal education sub-program) include the need to 
establish institutional structures in all justice sector institutions that manage the 
justice system reform program and substantially enhance the capacity of JLRTI 
in expertise, resources and facilities commensurate with its functions. These 
recommendations further state the need to identify the projects under the justice 
system reform program that have not been implemented, and mobilize fund and 
manpower for their implementation.  
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 Id. pp. 157, 158. 
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 Id., p. 154. 
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3.  JLRTI’s Mandates to Coordinate Justice Sector Reform –vis-
à-vis- Gaps in Institutional Continuity  
As indicated in the preceding paragraph, there is the need for ―substantial 
enhancement in the capacity of JLRTI in expertise, resources and facilities 
commensurate with its functions of supporting justice sector institutions‖. Even 
though the Federal Attorney General and JLRTI have overlapping functions in 
legislative drafting and law revision, the remaining components of justice 
system reform clearly fall under the responsibilities of the entities that are in 
charge of the respective sub-programs, thereby requiring follow-up, 
harmonization and coordination.  
The Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Attorney General (which can 
coordinate the reform sub-programs of prosecution services and prisons), Justice 
and Legal System Research and Training Institute, and the Consortium of 
Ethiopian Law Schools are the entities in charge of the sub-programs in the 
justice system reform. At the level of coordination and harmonization, there 
should also be the representation of the legal profession through the Ethiopian 
Lawyers Association, which according to the 2005 Baseline Study Report,42 is 
expected to be recognized by law and be entrusted with tasks that include 
licensing attorneys and handling cases of discipline with due participation of 
other stakeholders including the Federal Attorney General.  
Legal information is a cross-cutting component in Ethiopia‘s justice system 
reform program, and Article 4(2) of Proclamation No. 1071/2018 requires the 
Justice and Legal Research and Training Institute to make ―available 
comprehensive information about the justice systems of the country‖ and ―be a 
center of justice and legal information‖. In spite of this mandate, however, 
JLRTI does not even have an official website that has basic legal information. 
This clearly indicates budgetary, human resource and ICT constraints.   
In 2016, JLSRI (currently restructured as JLRTI) was not willing to receive 
and administer fund from the African Law Library Project (under the African 
Innovation Foundation fund) towards the preparation and publication of EtLex 
Volume 2. As a result, the series titled EtLex could not be sustained. The 
volume was a sequel in the series of publications to enhance Ethiopian legal 
information by indexing proclamations and translating Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation decisions. The first volume of the project EtLex Volume 143 was 
successful (in 2013), and the level of attention to the second phase of the project 
                                           
42
 Baseline Study, supra note 2, p. 23 (The Judiciary, Recommendation No. 15). 
43
 EtLex, Volume 1, (2013), Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium, Selected Federal 
Cassation Decisions and Ethiopian Law Index (1995-2012), Published by Justice and 
Legal Systems Research Institute, December 2013.   
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substantially declined in 2016. This shows that the challenges in continuity 
further involve gaps in the sustained pursuance of projects and tasks. 
According to Article 5(4) of Proclamation No. 1071/2018, JLRTI has the 
responsibility of ―coordinating, integrating and ensuring the effectiveness of the 
justice system and legal education reform programmes as well as other reform 
program carried out in the justice sector.‖  Even though the Advisory Council 
(that is envisaged to be established under JLRTI Proclamation No. 1071/2018) 
is not expressly mandated to coordinate the reform tasks of justice sector 
institutions, Article 12(1) of the Proclamation clearly empowers the Advisory 
Council to serve as a forum where ―federal justice organs shall work in 
collaboration in order to coordinate and facilitate the Institute‘s activities‖.  
There is yet another restructuring based on Article 33(8)(d) of the Powers 
and Duties of the Executive  Organs  Proclamation No. 1097/2018 which has 
made JLRTI accountable to the Federal Attorney General‘s Office, by changing 
JLRTI‘s accountability to the Prime Minister‘s Office under Proc. No. 
1071/2018. Under both proclamations, the Federal Justice Organs Professionals 
Training Center (JOPTC) which has merged with JLSRI (to form JLRTI) comes 
under the executive even though it, inter alia, offers judicial training. This 
inevitably necessitates undoing what was done, i.e., splitting JLRTI into JLSRI 
(Justice and Legal System Research Institute) and reinstituting JOPTC as a 
Judicial Training Center under the Federal Supreme Court.   
There have been series of interruptions in institutional memory that have 
caused discontinuity in JLSRI‘s and JOPTC‘s tasks and services. Equally 
important is JLRTI (formerly JLSRI)‘s location so that it can be convenient to 
attract and retain professional staff and be easily accessible to all stakeholders in 
justice system reform including the legal profession at large.   
Unfortunately, however, this crucial factor of location has not been given due 
attention since JLRTI (formerly JLSRI) was forced to leave the compound of 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (in 2010/11) while in fact – 
at the current information age– the Ministry could have regarded the premises in 
its compound adequate for its functions.  The new premises constructed past 
Ayat (at the outskirts of Addis Ababa), to be used by JLRTI, can only serve as a 
training center and not as premises to a legal research institute whose offices, 
facilities and library should be accessible (at a convenient location) to the justice 
sector, law schools, researchers and the legal profession at large.  
4.   Caveats against Disrupting Institutional Continuity by 
Scrapping Entire Codes of Law in the Name of ‘Revision’ 
While law reforms in areas such as Ethiopia‘s anti-terror legislation, the 
proclamation on civil societies, etc., are expedient, there is the need for caution 
against trends in law revision that aim at scrapping the codes of law enacted in 
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the 1960s. This author has expressed the views indicated in the following 
paragraphs to colleagues at the Justice and Legal Research and Training 
Institute44 and the Federal Attorney General45 regarding the need for caution in 
the course of revising the Civil Code and the Commercial Code. 
The view which considers the Civil Code as outdated (merely because it was 
enacted fifty-eight years ago) is not persuasive even though there are indeed 
Civil Code provisions that need reform. Yet, the ‗age‘ of the Codes is repeatedly 
stated at the opening statements of various (Codes of Law Revision) workshops. 
Of course, there are parts of the Civil Code that have already been replaced, 
such as land law, intellectual property law and family law.  But in various parts 
of the Code, including the issue of family name in law of persons, we have not 
yet attained some of the objectives that were envisaged. Unfortunately, we tend 
to radically negate the past (analogous to throwing away a child with the 
bathwater), and build up afresh (which is unwise).  For example, the codes of 
law in France are over two hundred years old, and new changes stand over the 
shoulders of the preceding laws.  
In our case, we rush to change rather than merely amend the ones that are 
obsolete. As a French proverb goes, ―plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose‖ 
(―the more things change [fast], the more would they remain the same‖).  In 
some of the revisions, unnecessary confusion is created, because the Criminal 
Code, for example, could have been revised without substantial change in the 
number designations of the provisions. With careful drafting, most provisions 
could have retained their numbers as it is duly done in Articles 1-33, 46-47, 48-
53, and 56-59 of the 2004 Criminal Code. 
The inclusion of Article 34 on corporate criminal liability, for example, was 
indeed appropriate. The title of Article 32 could have been amended as 
―Principal Criminal Liability and Special Crimes‖ to accommodate Article 33 of 
the 1957 Penal Code as Article 32(4) of the 2004 Criminal Code. This could 
have enabled corporate criminal liability to be designated as Article 33 without 
disturbing Articles 34 to 45.  This could have been done throughout the Code 
thereby retaining the judicial jurisprudence and academic literature that was 
accumulated from 1957 to 2004. 
The same applies for provisions that may be omitted during revisions of 
other codes of law because a preceding or an immediately following provision 
can be split into two in order to maintain sequence in subsequent provisions. In 
the case of substantial omissions, amendments can state the numbers omitted 
and then proceed with the old sequence. Where there is a substantial insertion of 
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new provisions, alphabetical designations can be attached to numbers, as is the 
case of amendments to the 1804 French Civil Code that has periodically updated 
consolidated versions.  Likewise, the Swiss Civil Code of 1907 updates the 
Code with new changes rather than scrapping it en toto.  
This facilitates the transmission of judicial decisions and academic literature 
to generations, because in continental legal systems, court decisions and 
academic literature cite provisions and not cases thereby rendering easier 
reference to the number designations of provisions very important. In this 
regard, we can draw lessons from the drafter of the 1957 Penal Code, Professor 
Jean Graven, his team and the legislature for having used 120A after Article 
120. The drafter did not originally include flogging as punishment, but the issue 
of lashes to a maximum of 'arba jiraf' (forty lashes) was persistently raised as 
traditionally important by certain members in the legislative process, and the 
drafter had no option, other than including it.  
However, the drafter was aware that flogging will be obsolete after certain 
years owing to Ethiopia's steady interactions with the international community 
and in the course of legal development in Ethiopia. It was not thus given a 
number on its own (i.e. Article 121), but was included as Article 120A. As 
proactively envisaged by the drafter, the provision was obsolete (after a few 
years) in courts of law. The Civil Code can thus be amended without scrapping 
it aside.  
The same holds true for the Commercial Code because most of the numerical 
designations of the earlier Commercial Code can be maintained with careful 
draftsmanship. This can be done by blending immediately preceding (or 
subsequent) provisions to accommodate newly inserted provisions.  Changing 
the entire numerical designations of the Commercial Code including various 
landmark provisions would mean throwing away our legacy that is accumulated 
since the 1960s in textbooks, scholarly articles, judicial decisions, etc., which 
cite specific provisions. One of the problems in Ethiopia relate to our inability to 
stand over the shoulders of earlier achievements (while we could have focused 
on what needs to be corrected and developed). To borrow a phrase from Dr. 
Mehret Debebe‘s statement (during a radio interview), it is always wise to 
consider the ―ceiling of an earlier achievement‖ as the ―floor for new pursuits.‖ 
Where consistency in numerical designation becomes impossible (while 
revising some parts of codes of law), the usual practice is to let the specific 
branches of the law emerge and stand on their own feet. With regard to the 
Commercial Code, there is apparently the need for responding to the steadily 
unfolding realities which require changes in the formation and operation of 
companies. However, this can, for example, be accommodated by a new law 
that can be designated as Ethiopian Law on Commercial Companies, analogous 
to  the laws on insurance, banking etc, that have already stood on their own feet 
even if certain provisions of the Commercial Code are still relevant to the 
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sectors. Under this option, the (1960-2018) judicial jurisprudence and literature 
related to the 1960 Commercial Code can stay undisturbed (because there would 
not be namesake/ሞክሼ confusion).  
5. The Nexus between Good Governance and Justice Sector 
Reform  
Worldwide good governance indicators46 include six dimensions of governance: 
―1. Voice and Accountability (VA): …the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV): … the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence 
and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness (GE): … the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy  formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ): … the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. 
5. Rule of Law (RL): …the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
6. Control of Corruption (CC): … the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests‖.47 
These six dimensions are enablers for Ethiopia‘s justice system reform. The 
first dimension (Voice and Accountability) is a sine qua non condition for a 
competent legislative body and independent judiciary. The legitimacy of 
governments under theocracy, monarchy, communism, etc. is attributed to 
                                           
46 The World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators  
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home> 
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 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues, Global Economy and 
Development at Brookings, p. 4. 
         For further discussion on in the application of the six dimensions to justice sector 
reform, see Stebek (2016), Ethiopia‘s Justice Sector Components in GTP I and II, 
Ethiopian Lawyers Association (pp. 74, 75). 
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factors other than the ballot box. On the contrary, governments that claim to 
pursue constitutional democracy attribute their legitimacy to elections. 
Whenever governments use the ballot-box as a façade, they intervene in the 
operations of public prosecution services, the judiciary, electoral boards/ 
commissions, the media etc., to suppress opposition political parties; and they 
operate in the context of a rubber-stamp parliaments and non-independent 
judiciary.   
The second dimension (Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ 
Terrorism) can be related with the population‘s perception of government 
legitimacy. It can also be related with various social and economic grievances. 
Societies that are polarized due to religious, ethnic and clan hostilities are 
mostly volatile. Elites usually hijack and exacerbate such hostilities towards 
economic and political ‗gains‘, although they usually end up in ‗lose-lose‘ 
scenarios.   
Laws envisage compliance, and violations are regarded as exceptions. 
However, order and stability are disrupted where mobs (in the crude form of 
ochlocracy) take the law into their hands. This not only reflects lawlessness, but 
it is also a symptom of erosion in the fabric that holds neighborhoods, 
communities and a society together. Achievements in Ethiopia‘s justice system 
reform thus, inter alia, depend on the extent to which the root causes for such 
acts are addressed.   
The core foundation of terrorism is one of the basic emotions in human 
beings, i.e., ‗anger-fear‘.  In their positive dimension, 'anger' secures justice 
(as in the case of an infant whose toy is unduly taken by another child, civil 
disobedience, legitimate strikes, etc,); and 'fear' facilitates survival (as in the 
case of subconsciously-enhanced pace in running from an aggressive wild 
animal). These basic emotions of ‗anger‘ and ‗fear‘ can be distorted in the 
course of ideological, ethnic or religious fanaticism, or as over-reaction in the 
course of counter-terrorism. 48 
The third dimension of good governance (Government Effectiveness), inter 
alia, relates to the quality of public services (including justice sector 
institutions) and the degree of ―independence from political pressures‖.  The 
scene of widespread street vending at various parts of Addis Ababa clearly 
verifies the gaps in the effectiveness of law enforcement and its inability to 
protect tax payers from the wave of contraband merchandise. One can, for 
example, recall the effectiveness of community guards in Merkato (for many 
years) while they were under a business development association. A letter from 
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the Chief Executive Officer of the Sub-city,49 repealed the earlier practice, and 
the community guards operate under a Police Station since November 2016. 
Merkato is engulfed in street vending during the last two years. While the 
former option was effective governance with the participation of stakeholders, 
the latter represents regulation under a government organ without stakeholder 
engagement.  
Gaps in government effectiveness are reflected in various public services. 
For example, streets (through tacit or explicit ultra vires consent of municipal 
offices) are illegally enclosed by individuals as in the case of a building 
construction work that has (for about three years) blocked a street between the 
building where Flamingo Café (Bole Road) is located and Tomy Tower.   
The fourth dimension of good governance (Regulatory Quality) is, inter alia, 
manifested by the extent to which policies and laws ―permit and promote private 
sector development‖ thereby enhancing livelihoods which include economic 
efficiency and social well being in the context of environmental sustainability.  
There are concerns such as the need for land tenure security which require 
revisiting Ethiopia‘s rural and urban land laws because Ethiopia‘s land laws do 
not empower broad-based private sector development. As indicated in various 
studies (such as the ones highlighted in Section 9 below), there is the need for 
legal regime reforms toward private sector empowerment in the context of 
inclusive economic development whereby landholders and entrepreneurs can 
team up in win-win economic activities.  Absence of stock market in Ethiopia is 
another issue that needs regulatory attention to enhance broad-based saving and 
investment.  
Regulatory quality further envisages harmonization and professionalism in 
legal drafting and promulgation. For example, various institutions haphazardly 
incorporate ‗penal‘ provisions thereby creating fragmentation and confusion in 
the criminal law regime. This is inconsistent with Article 3 of the 2004 Criminal 
Code which allows other penal legislation (outside the Criminal Code) as an 
exception only when it is enacted as a regulation to enforce the Criminal Code, 
or if it is enacted as a special law of a criminal nature.   
There is extensive discourse and literature on the challenges in the fifth and 
sixth dimensions of good governance, i.e., gaps in ‗rule of law‘ and ‗control of 
corruption‘ in the context of Ethiopia. The apparent gaps in the fifth dimension 
include problems in contract enforcement and property rights protection. 
Moreover, the impediment in the sixth dimension, i.e., level of corruption 
deserves utmost attention. These challenges call for due attention to the root 
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causes, while at the same time steadily combating their manifestations and 
effects.  
6. The Tension between Ethnic Hostilities and Good Governance  
The first dimension of good governance, i.e., voice and accountability embodies 
two elements. As highlighted in the preceding section, the first element (voice) 
refers to ‗the participation of citizens in selecting the government‘, while the 
second element refers to the extent to which the government is accountable, 
which includes freedom of speech, freedom of association and the media. Both 
elements are indispensable in good governance.  
Good governance is an enabler in all pillars of justice sector reform. Ethnic 
hostilities impede the attainment of both limbs in the first dimension of good 
governance. Under settings where ethnic hostilities and extremist perceptions of 
ethnic distinctiveness are entrenched, a minority ethnic group that coercively 
holds power inclines toward vote rigging, manipulating elections and 
intervention in electoral boards/commissions because most voters tend to cast 
their votes to candidates who belong to their ethnic group. A minority ethnic 
group that is coercively in power cannot thus retain office through free and fair 
elections under ethnic polarities thereby rendering transgressions against rule of 
law and judicial independence its modus operandi.  
Such ruling parties invest much energy, time and finance to manipulate 
constituencies before elections, and devote equal attention to post-election 
justifications and show trials after the elections (which in the Ethiopian context 
included ‗anti-terrorism‘ charges and convictions). Under this setting, 
governments are mostly trapped in a ‗legitimacy‘ syndrome, and only a small 
percentage of their ‗term‘ (between ‗elections‘) is devoted to governmental 
functions. Such ‗legitimacy‘ syndrome is also susceptible to fraudulent reporting 
of ‗achievements‘ (in development pursuits) as a result of fixations on unduly 
exaggerated figures and statistics rather than pragmatic and functional 
achievements commensurate with the requisite pace, quality and standards.  
On the contrary, a political party (in ethnically polarized societies) from an 
ethnic group (that constitutes the majority of a country‘s population) does not 
need to manipulate elections unless there are competing ethno-radical 
candidates in similar constituencies (with substantial support-base) from the 
same ethnic group. Even though such ethnic-based political parties may not 
usually resort to fake elections, they may not enthusiastically pursue the second 
limb in the first dimension of good governance, i.e., accountability.  This is 
because their political offices are mainly secured by ethnicity rather than policy 
roadmap, competence, integrity and commitment. Such candidates may lack 
sense of accountability to citizens in their constituencies.   
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Ethnic groups in Ethiopia constitute the majority in most of the regional 
states in Ethiopia other than Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
Regional State (SNNPRS) and the two chartered cities, i.e. Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa. Ethnic politics can thus erode accountability and enhance ethno-
centric populism in the regional states. Such contest in populism between 
ethnic-based political groups in their constituencies is susceptible to an adverse 
race in ethnic radicalism to win the impressions and sentiments of the electorate 
in lieu of rational ideas. Such extreme political polarities accompanied by the 
proliferation of political parties can significantly hamper post-election 
policymaking and legislative productivity.  
Opportunities in this regard relate to the coalitions and political platforms 
which can eventually lead to their merger onto multiethnic political parties. For 
example, EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front) is, at 
some point, expected to omit the qualifier ‗revolutionary‘ when it fully 
disentangles itself from its Leninist ideological heritages (of the ‗New 
Democratic Revolution‘) even if it can still remain within the social democratic 
fold. At such a stage, the word ‗Front‘ is expected to be revisited and substituted 
by a word which fits to its current and upcoming policy roadmaps.  
Ethiopia‘s experience indicates that the second dimension of good 
governance (i.e. political stability and absence of violence) cannot be attained in 
the context of ethnic hostilities. Plutchik‘s views on pairs of emotions (such 
as joy-sadness, anger-fear, trust-disgust, surprise-anticipation)50 provide insights 
into the basic emotions of individuals that can be manipulated by radical ethno-
nationalists. A provocation by a certain group evokes anger and chain of 
negative emotions which trigger further reactions based on revenge, distrust and 
fear thereby rendering peace, governance through law and rule of law difficult. 
Fraternity based on shared citizenship and trust is susceptible to erosion 
under ethnic hostilities, and on the contrary, distrust entrenches fear and anger 
thereby making it difficult for the justice system to ensure order and political 
stability. The current digital age and social media exacerbate these challenges 
owing to the ease, magnitude and pace of dissemination including manipulative 
misinformation. Actual and anticipated ethnic-based or religion-based hostilities 
adversely affect political stability, social harmony and economic performance 
thereby rendering it difficult for the justice system to ensure law and order.  
Politics per se  is based on rational discourse and shared citizenship, while 
ethnic ‗politics‘ primarily targets at emotion and claims of common descent, 
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language and distinctiveness. Ethnic-based politics thus renders it difficult to 
attain the first two dimensions of good governance. This cascades to the other 
dimensions, because gaps and challenges in the first and second dimensions of 
good governance have direct relationship with the remaining four dimensions, 
i.e. government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and effective 
control against corruption that are adversely affected by ethnic-based politics.   
7. Law Compliant Citizenship and Justice Sector Effectiveness  
7.1 The need to restore public trust  
Public service constitutes the raison d’être of justice sector institutions, and 
public trust in the justice system is determined by the level and quality of actual 
performance.  Restoration of public trust, after its substantial decline, can be 
compared with land reclamation through the rehabilitation of degraded 
agricultural land due to grave problems such as gully erosion.  As Lal noted, 
―[a]n eroded rill, on deepening and widening, becomes a gully. A gully is 
sufficiently deep that it would not be obliterated by normal tillage operations, 
whereas a rill is of lesser depth and would be smoothed by ordinary tillage‖.51  
As gully erosion cannot be restored by ordinary tillage, the gravity of the 
problems in Ethiopia‘s justice system requires a thorough self-assessment of the 
sub-sectors. It also needs survey-based assessment on the gravity of the 
problems with due participation of stakeholders so that the magnitude of the 
problems can be identified based on Truth and Reason. This is because laws and 
the institutions in charge of lawmaking, adjudication, enforcement, legal 
education and access to justice that are not informed by Truth (in terms of 
objective and subjective realities) and Reason cannot be effective.  
In the gully analogy, the act of restoring a gully cannot be adequate unless its 
root causes are addressed. Such measures include the need to deal with the 
problem such as concentrated runoff of floods that caused the gully. Likewise, 
there should be deeper examination into the root causes that have adversely 
affected the operations and services of justice sector institutions. Such deeper 
diagnosis and effective pursuits call for the blend between autonomy and 
harmonization in the reform pursuits of each sub-sector.  
7.2  The need to enhance law compliant citizenship  
In the absence of law compliant citizenship, the justice sector becomes 
susceptible to caseloads in investigation, prosecution and adjudication that 
impede efficiency and effectiveness. Various factors such as widespread public 
perception of illegitimacy of a government in office, dwarfed moral authority of 
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corrupt office holders, and wrong policies erode law compliant citizenship. This, 
in the Ethiopian context, is exacerbated by ethnic-based perceptions of ―we‖ and 
the ―others‖ that have been nurtured by the political leadership during the past 
decades.   
We can, for example, recall Aristotle‘s view that good thoughts lead to good 
actions, and can through repetition become good habits and good character. On 
the contrary, thoughts that emanate from misrepresentation, ideological 
‗indoctrination‘ and hatred-infested politicking (including social media hate 
scripts) are distorted and usually antagonistic. It is thus Truth and Reason that 
can create shared beliefs and positive thoughts that are in tune with the reality, 
general will and the rule of law.  
Manipulation of emotions through misrepresentation is a breeding ground for 
irrational hostilities and lawlessness, while reason nurtures inquiry, moral 
standards, work ethic, quality education and law compliant citizenship. Wider 
scope of freedom in a legal regime presumes higher levels of awareness and 
moral responsibility from citizens. On the contrary, substantial reform in a legal 
regime can unmask the level of hostilities, intolerance and gaps in political 
culture that were concealed under suppressive regimes. Under settings where 
legal regimes with wider levels of freedom are accompanied by the requisite 
level of law compliant citizenship, professional associations nurture and control 
occupational conduct, and the society‘s value systems are among the core 
sources of individual moral standards.     
The ethnic hostilities that are occurring in Ethiopia illustrate gaps in law 
compliant citizenship. It is in spite of Ethiopia‘s criminal law regime that the 
Jigjiga tragedy, for example, occurred on August 4, 2018. It was unimaginable 
that the heavy loss in life and property including arson against churches would 
occur in a country which is known for the level of tolerance and cooperation 
among religions.  As Basu observes: 
The might of the law, even though it may be backed up by handcuffs, jails, 
and guns, is, in its elemental form, nothing but a structure of beliefs carried 
in the heads of all the people in society—from the ordinary citizenry to the 
police, politicians and judges—, intertwining and reinforcing one another, till 
they become as strong as concrete structures … . The most important 
ingredients of a republic, including its power and might, reside in nothing 
more than the beliefs and expectations of ordinary people going about their 
quotidian chores.52 
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Any meaningful reform in lawmaking and revision should thus pay attention 
to the beliefs and expectations that have brought about the actions of citizens 
such as the Jigjiga hostilities, Gedeo and West Guji zone conflicts and ethnic 
displacements. In September 2018, these hostilities and displacements 
continued, in various parts of Ethiopia such as Burayu, Benishangul Gumuz 
Regional State (Kamashi Zone), and others. Even though Ethiopia is not yet a 
fragile state (a phase that signals the prelude to failed statehood), ethnic 
hostilities and the perceptions that trigger them need to be carefully examined in 
the course of justice system reform. The magnitude of the problems in this 
regard can be easily verified by the fact that Ethiopia has become a country with 
the largest displaced population in the world due to ethnic clashes.53  
It is becoming common to equate the word ‗hizb‘ with ethnic homogeneity 
(in a regional state) as a semantic referent. This approach entrenches the 
dichotomy of ―we‖ and ―the rest other than us‖ in the minds of linguistic 
groups. Such perception erodes sense of citizenship and can be easily hijacked 
by ethnic entrepreneurs who speculate toward economic gains and political 
power.  If we opt to use the word ‗hizb‘ at sub-national level, it should have 
retained its inherent heterogeneity, as in the case of usages such as ‗የቀበላው ሕዝብ/ 
people in the Kebele‘ which refers to every resident irrespective of ethnicity and 
religion. Any different usage is expected to have a qualifier to show specific 
reference.  
Professor Bahru Zewde had (at a workshop) suggested that we use the phrase 
‗የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ/ Ethiopian people‘ rather than ―የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝቦች/Ethiopian peoples.‖ 
It is thus high time that views of historians, sociologists and other experts on 
their respective fields be seriously considered in the context of critical thinking 
and informed discourse. The following observation by Kymlicka shows the need 
for caution in the use of the word ‗peoples‘ rather than ‗people‖ in the context of 
a country‘s population: 
... Multinational federalism divides the people into separate ‗peoples‘, each 
with its own historic rights, territories, and powers of self-government; and 
each, therefore with its own political community. They may view their own 
political community as primary, and the value and authority of the larger 
federation as derivative.54  
Kymlicka further states that in order to reduce this danger of deep division, 
―federal governments have encouraged national minorities to identify with, and 
feel loyalty towards, the federal government‖, and he notes that ―the historical 
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record suggests that these efforts have limited success‖.55  Attainments in this 
regard thus need due attention to the root factors transcend official statements 
and pledges.  
There have been challenges in maintaining the proper balance between ethnic 
identity and sense of membership in the bigger Ethiopian political community. 
In this regard, there were earlier symptoms of ethnic tensions that could have 
served as wake-up calls. Physical assaults in university campuses and soccer 
games that reflect ethnic tension could have been regarded as symptoms in 
diagnosing the problems. On the contrary, there are Ethiopian universities that 
are becoming hubs for ethnic-based student groupings and tensions, while they 
should have been forums for rational discourse, critical thinking and 
cosmopolitanism.  
Ethnic hostilities indeed affect nation-building. As René Grotenhuis notes, 
the ―process of nation-building boils down to ‗forging a sense of common 
nationhood‘, 56 and he raises the following issues:  
How can we make sure that Luos and Kikuyus identify themselves as 
Kenyans and that the Kenyan nationhood is an important aspect of their 
identity? The same challenge goes for people of different ethnic and tribal 
affiliations ... .  
   ... [I]n many fragile contexts, the state is absent or, worse, a perpetrator of 
acts of violence. In such a reality, people look towards their family, tribe, 
clan or religious community to find protection and to access basic needs like 
food, shelter and medical care.57 
Grotenhuis uses a model formulated by Shulman in his discussion on the 
components of national identity. According Shulman, there are three layers of 
collective identity, i.e., ethnic, cultural and civic.  The first layer (i.e. ethnic 
identity) is based on ancestry and race, while the second layer (cultural identity) 
is based on [factors such as] language and tradition. Civic identity that is shared 
by all citizens is the third layer which is based on citizenship, territory, will and 
consent, political ideology, political institutions and laws.  
Shulman‘s three main elements (civic identity, cultural identity, ethnicity) 
and their underlying components are the building blocks of a national 
identity, but their relative importance of weight is not defined in advance. It 
is an open model that leaves space for a contextual and diverse understanding 
of national identity. ... What is at stake is not the objective truth about the 
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different elements and components and their relative importance, but the 
extent to which people actually use these labels to define their national 
identity. ... If we want to build a national identity, this will have to be a 
bottom-up process.58 
Various Ethiopian laws including the FDRE Constitution use nations, 
nationalities and peoples without clarity in definition and context. There should 
have been caution in using the word ‗nation‘ for pre-industrial ethno-cultural 
groups of people, unless it is used in a country-wide context of nation-state or 
nation-building. Such conceptual clarity could have facilitated harmony among 
the triadic elements of a person‘s collective identity (i.e., ethnic, cultural and 
national identity, with the latter representing Ethiopian identity).   
The following conversation between Dr. Alex de Waal59 and the late prime 
minister, Meles Zenawi (while the latter was alive) relates to nation building: 
Question (Alex de Waal): 
…[A]ny attempt to define nations and nationalities in a non-industrial society 
involves applying a set of more-or-less arbitrary criteria concerning 
language, culture, territory, etc. If the criteria are adjusted even ever-so-
slightly, the groups or populations that are identified as nations will alter, 
their boundaries will change, etc. [Secondly] … economic development 
…will change the character of those national entities. People will migrate, 
they will be organized differently, cultures will change. This is normal. So 
how will your definition of ‗nation‘ change as Ethiopia industrializes? And 
what does this mean for the constitution? 60 
Response (Meles Zenawi): 
This is a critically important point that we have not resolved. It may be the 
most politically sensitive and explosive question that we need to face. Our 
federal formula was devised during the transition in negotiation with the 
OLF. … They regressed to a narrow nationalism that is the obverse of 
developmentalism or democratic nationalism. Meanwhile, the chauvinists 
adopted another pathology of nationalism, inherited from the feudal-imperial 
past, of a pan-Ethiopian chauvinism that refuses to recognize other national-
cultural entities as equals. For us to move forward, it is absolutely essential 
that the equal status of nations and nationalities is not only enshrined in the 
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Federal Constitution but is internalized as part of our common political 
discourse. This is the foundation of democratic nationalism.61 
The late prime minister‘s response is clearly untenable because political 
polarities are not managed through explosive experiments that are more harmful 
than the problems they are meant to resolve. This risky experiment can clearly 
be observed from the minutes of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
(TGE) during the seven meetings of the Council of TGE (mostly constituted of 
ethnic-based political groups that were members of the TGE) held on Meskerem 
6, 8, 20, 22, 24, 27 and 29 in 1984 Ethiopian calendar (i.e. September/October 
1991).  With regard to the determination of regions/ kilils, the minutes of the 
Council of the TGE state the following views that were expressed by Councils‘s 
chairperson, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi:  
The chairperson stated that the criteria for the delineation of regions/kilils is 
a basic issue; language, geographic adjacency and psychological make-up are 
adopted by the Council as criteria. The issue of nation or nationality is not 
biological but a historical process. This recognizes irreversible historical 
phenomena that are positive and negative. Or else, conflicts will ensue. For 
example, it can be said that most of the northern part including Tigray, 
Godjam, Gondar and Wollo were originally Agaw, and orgin cannot be the 
premise [criteria for regions]. The actual realities indicate that many parts of 
Wollo that were Oromo communities are now Amharic speakers and there 
are communities that still speak Oromiffa. On the other hand, these 
communities are not adjacent to their [ethnic group], and it seems preferable 
to allow them to form their own Woreda Councils (Shengos). 62    
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was thus fully aware that 
the fourteen regions that were formed during the transition period (later 
reclassified into nine regions and two cities under the 1995 FDRE Constitution63) 
were based on linguistic lines and other factors such as geographic adjacency 
and psychological make-up, and not biological origin.  In reality, however, the 
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experiment was susceptible to the creation of false consciousness towards 
biological/ethnic distinctiveness. 
Alex de Waal was curious as to why EPRDF opted to adopt ethnic federalism 
that might not be conducive to changing realities in the course of Ethiopia‘s 
economic development. The following question relates to this concern: 
But I still see some big problems. Nations are not static and unchanging, 
especially when they are entities within a ‗nation of nations‘. Isn‘t there a 
danger of getting stuck with a system that cannot adapt to historical 
changes—especially with the pace of economic development that is now 
occurring? 64 
The following was the response of the late prime minister:  
That is why we are decentralizing important elements of governance, such as 
budgeting, to the zonal level and even lower. We need to have the right 
balance between the powers that are held at all different levels of 
government. If we invest too much in one single layer, there is the danger 
that the corresponding level of officialdom will become rent-seekers based 
on the outsized administrative privileges of that particular level. When the 
system was designed in 1991, the nations determined the administration. We 
want to avoid a situation in future where the administration determines the 
nations, which is what doomed Yugoslavia and the USSR.  
    There is also no reason why the EPRDF should be comprised of 
constituent parties that match the federal entities and are confined to them. 
There is no other federal system where party politics is run on this basis. We 
are considering making the EPRDF into a single unified national party. This 
would be a logical step, but it needs to be taken at the correct time with all 
the necessary preparation.65 
The response of the late prime minister clearly shows the risks in region-
based party politics.  He had also noted the need for the transition of EPRDF 
into a single unified party. However, the challenge that may adversely affect the 
pace of reform towards EPRDF‘s transition to a multinational party can be the 
competition of EPRDF members with other ethno-radical parties for wider 
support base (in their constituencies) which can promote ethnic-based populism.  
The current major ―obstacles and challenges‖ in Ethiopia‘s nation building 
pursuits ―come from populisms animated by rival nationalisms, and their 
possible entanglements with organized politics‖.66 Current realities clearly 
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indicate ―a growing divide among the nationalist populisms and an effort by 
regional parties or their rivals to win the support of populist movements.‖67 
Political platforms relate to competing rational ideas and not ethnicity. For 
example, Ghana‘s Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties that 
are tribal or ethnic based. It provides that ―Every political party shall have a 
national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, 
regional or other sectional divisions‖.68  
The way forward in the path of effective nation building thus envisages a 
legal regime that encourages multi-ethnic political party formations, and the 
inclusion of non-ethnic members in ethnic based political groups which can lead 
to broader multi-ethnic political platforms. Positive developments in this regard 
relate to the reform processes in member parties of EPRDF that have expressed 
their intention to allow membership to non-ethnic residents of their respective 
regions who support their political programmes. Meanwhile, mass 
organizations, civil societies and other entities are expected to conduct various 
activities to protect collective rights which can, indeed, include ethnic and 
religious groups.  
8.  Peace, Order and Stability in the Context of Diversity  
As peace (order) and freedom are two sides of the same coin, rule of law is 
unimaginable in the context of disorder and lawlessness. The latter not only 
affects the lives and property of citizens, but also exacerbates mass 
encroachments to forests, fragile landscape and wildlife. Polarities –which can 
ultimately bring about fragility and failed statehood– need not necessarily be 
among different linguistic and religious groups. It is to be noted that shared 
language and religion did not save Libya or Yemen from such tragedies.  
Upon the disruption of the social fabric of a society –including value systems 
of pluralism, tolerance and fraternity– the effectiveness of laws and justice 
system institutions decline. In effect, individuals, gangs and mobs merely pursue 
their whims that trigger attacks, counter-attacks and hostilities.  It is under such 
settings that virtues in the inner-self of many citizens dwindle. Subsequent 
realities can then bring about a chaotic setting that was explained by Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) based on his observations during prolonged civil wars in 
Britain. Such chaos and anarchy can only lead to tyranny under a ‗supreme 
sovereign‘ in the quest for order rather than rule of law.   
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The way forward does not lie in the Ethiopian unitary state, which unlike 
countries such as France, has not become successful in Ethiopia during the pre-
1991 regimes. Nor can ethnic radicalism bring about the balance between unity 
and diversity.  There is thus the need to address the causes of the disequilibrium 
in the unity and diversity nexus while at the same time dealing with the 
symptoms in the course of justice system reform (including legislative reform). 
Mere enactment of laws that deal with individual freedom in a multinational 
state ―overlooks the fact that people identify with their particular community on 
the basis of their special or distinctive features…‖.69 Respect for diversity thus 
becomes inevitable in multiethnic societies. However, the notion of diversity 
can be misconstrued by ethno-radicalism which ―includes all political endeavour 
that bases the distinction between friend and foe on ethnic characteristics and 
pursues its aims accordingly, even by violent means‖.70 This causes ethnic 
conflict in multinational states as long as the foundations are ripe. As Feiner 
observes: 
If one wishes to search for new state concepts that could prevent ethnic 
conflicts or at least manage them peacefully, one needs to know the real 
causes of such conflicts. However, the views and theories as to the causes are 
as diverse as the conflicts themselves. Possible causes include: 
-  economy (social injustice), 
- history (retaliation for historical injustice, denial of self-determination, 
historical discrimination), 
- ethnic communities living in foreign neighbouring territory, religious 
fundamentalism, 
-  power-hungry warlords, 
-  fear and mistrust as consequence of terrorism of minorities and terrorism of 
the state.71 
These objective realities constitute foundations for ethnic conflict that can 
erupt when the subjective conditions are ripe. As Feiner notes, the factors 
indicated above are ―in some way related to the issue of ethnic identity and the 
attendant self-awareness‖, and he states that ―the ethnic dispute is marked by a 
friend-foe mentality, which can be manipulated and radicalised by various 
private interests. Ethnic differences can be emotionalised in order to pursue 
economic, political, cultural or mere power interests, or to divert attention from 
other internal problems‖.72 
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While democracies are based upon the majority principle, addressing ethnic 
tensions calls for legal regimes that at the same time ensure equal treatment ―as 
an individual as well as a member of an ethnic community or collective‖ in the 
absence of which the majority rule can ―degenerate into a tyranny over 
minorities‖. 
If states want to hold different ethnicities together, the majority will have to 
grant minorities the right to be recognised as ethnic units or communities on 
equal footing with other ethnicities including the ethnic majority. It is not 
enough that people as individuals are treated equally. It is essential that 
members of minorities can see themselves as belonging to an ethnic unit or 
group, which as a collective entity is on an equal footing with all other 
communities within the state. …73 
In the course of ensuring  equal treatment and freedom of citizens as 
individuals and as an ethnic or religious collective,  the ―multicultural state can 
set itself the goal of holding society together by regarding diversity not as a 
burden but as an asset, and by fostering diversity as something that enriches 
society rather than merely ‗tolerating‘ diversity‖.74 
How can cultural diversity be fostered? The only known means to foster 
diversity is to not only grant rights and liberties to the various communities, 
but to also equip them with the necessary autonomy to develop themselves 
according to their own values. It is necessary to construct the constitutional 
framework in such a way that the vast majority of the population can identify 
with the multicultural state and can see it as ‗their‘ own state (‗we‘). People 
within such a state should be able to find a common answer to the questions: 
What is good for us as a multicultural community and what is good for us as 
a collective community? 75 
Feiner substantiates his views by using the Swiss experience which shows 
that generally accepted political values can ultimately bind multinational units 
of the federation thereby making such societies to steadily enhance their 
integration through common values: 
Given that the Swiss democratic polity has been organised around common 
interests and integration rather than (as in such homogeneous states as France 
and the United Kingdom) sectional conflict, the combat of interests, and 
clashing power, it has found a legitimate way to unite the existing diversity 
into a politically homogenous unit on the basis of generally accepted political 
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values. Compromise has thereby retained its legitimising function for the 
establishment of political and civic identity.76 
This explains the reason why federations under communist dictatorships 
failed and led to dismemberment (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia), while on the contrary they succeeded in constitutional 
democracies.  As Kymlicka notes,  
On any reasonable criteria, democratic federations, as opposed to Communist 
federations, have been surprisingly successful in accommodating minority 
nationalisms. Both historic multination federations, like Switzerland and 
Canada, and more recent multination federations, like Belgium and Spain, 
have not only managed the conflicts arising from their competing national 
identities in a peaceful and democratic way, but have also secured a high 
degree of economic prosperity and individual freedom for their citizens.77  
According to Kymlicka, this has been possible because ―democratic 
multination federations have succeeded in taming the force of nationalism‖ and 
―[d]emocratic federalism has domesticated and pacified nationalism, while 
respecting individual rights and freedoms‖.78  He also states that many federal 
systems in democratic countries (such as the United States or Australia)  ― were 
not designed as a response to ethnocultural pluralism‖ as a result of which the 
federal units do not correspond in any way with distinct ethnocultural groups 
who desire to retain their self-government and cultural distinctiveness‖. He 
further notes that ―[t]hese sorts of federal systems can be quite stable‖.79  It is 
also worth to note that such territorial federations (as in the case of the United 
States, Brazil, and others) can ―worsen the position of national minorities‖, 
unless the decisions about boundaries and powers are ―made with the conscious 
intention of empowering national minorities‖.80  
On the other hand ―nationality-based units will seek different and more 
extensive powers than regional-based units‖81, and ―of course the most extreme 
assertion of self-government-namely, secession-has only been made by 
nationality-based units, whether it be in the former Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
or the Soviet Union, not regional-based units‖.82 Kymlicka further examines the 
risks involved in nationality-based federations (as opposed to territorial 
federalism): 
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... Where national minorities become politically mobilized in this way, 
secession becomes more feasible, even with the best-designed federal 
institutions. … 
    … Multinational federations are often viewed by national minorities as if 
they were confederations. National minorities typically view themselves as 
distinct ‗peoples,‘ whose existence predates that of the country they currently 
belong to.  … 
    … But the political perceptions of national minorities are unlikely to 
match these legal niceties. For them, the larger country feels more like a 
confederation than a federation, in the sense that the larger country's 
existence is seen as morally dependent on the revocable consent of the 
constituent national units. ...83 
Contrary to these challenges, ―the experience to date in the West suggests 
that democratic multination federations are remarkably resilient‖ mainly owing 
to the focus ―on the intrinsic benefits of belonging to a federation-that is, the 
value of belonging to a country which contains national diversity‖. In the 
absence of balance between sense of belongingness to a federation and 
recognition of diversity, multination federal units in non-democratic countries 
regress culturally in addition to the risks of ultimate dismemberment. Upon the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the following reflections from its former prime 
minister, Petr Pithart, show the magnitude of loss that Prague had encountered 
due to its failure to embrace diversity under communist regimes: 
In the last 55 years, the Czechs have lost –as co-tenants in their common 
house– Germans, Jews, Ruthenians, Hungarians and Slovaks. They are now, 
in effect, an ethnically cleansed country, even if it was not by their own will. 
It is a great intellectual, cultural, and spiritual loss. This is particularly true if 
we consider central Europe, which is a kind of mosaic. We are still living 
touristically from the glory of Prague, which was a Czech-German-Jewish 
city and a light that reached to the stars. But you cannot win elections with 
that kind of argument.84 
Kymlicka agrees with Pithart‘s reflections that there is often a ‗great 
intellectual, cultural and spiritual loss‘ under such settings, but he believes that 
voters can indeed support candidates who oppose ethnically dichotomized 
constituencies depending on a country‘s history and the perception of most 
citizens. He underlines that ―average citizens are capable of seeing the benefits 
of living in a multination federation, and of comparing it with the alternatives, 
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most (if not all) of which have a much worse track record in dealing with 
ethnonational diversity‖.85 
9. The Tension between Multi-ethnic Civic Identity and Article 
39(1) of the FDRE Constitution 
Barrington discusses the confusion when the word ‗nation‘ is interchangeably 
used with ‗state‘ which represents ―the principal political unit in the 
international political system corresponding to a territory, a relatively permanent 
population, and a set of ruling institutions‖.86  He also states that it should not be 
misused as a word which is identical with the word ‗country‘ because the latter 
is ―the territorial component of the state‖. In short, the words nation, state and 
country respectively represent people, the political entity and territory. 
Moreover, Barrington criticizes the loose definition of ‗nation‘, a point that is 
very relevant to the current realities in Ethiopia: 
The most basic loose use of ‗nation‘ is the interchanging of the term and 
‗ethnic group‘ or ‗ethnicity.‘ ... [N]ations can evolve from ethnic groups ... A 
nation is more than an ethnic group, differing from such a group because of a 
nation's belief in its right to territorial control, or what Richmond (1987) calls 
its ‗territorial referent.‘ Also, and more important, nations need not even be 
based on a certain ethnic identity. Thus, the words ‗shared cultural features‘ 
in the definition of nation ... should not be read as ‗shared ethnic identity.‘ 
What are called ‗civic‘ or ‗political‘ nations in the nationalism literature have 
shared cultural features but are generally multiethnic in their make-up. ....87 
The way forward envisages the enhancement of multi-ethnic civic identity 
among all Ethiopians based on citizenship. One of the factors that may hamper 
the progressive coalescence of multi-ethnic civic identity seems to be 
misconceptions about the constitutional ‗right to secession‘ which can be 
manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs. The political leadership that managed to 
have Article 39(1)88 inserted in the FDRE Constitution seemed to have been 
satisfied because the sub-article comes prior to other provisions that articulate 
the core normative principles on self determination, self-government, equality 
and fraternity. However, the drafting team has substantially watered down the 
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word ‗unconditional‘ that is embodied in Article 39(1) by articulating 
procedures and the principles of equality, unity and fraternity.   
Until constitutional amendments (such as revisiting Article 39/1) are 
undertaken, there is the need for clarity regarding its relationship with other 
provisions. Article 39(1) lays down the principle of the right to self 
determination which is unconditional and whose scope can extend up to 
secession. Article 39(2) articulates the elements of self determination with 
regard to language, culture and history. Article 39(3) ensures self-government 
and equitable representation in state and Federal governments, thereby assuring 
the rights to self-rule and shared-rule. 
Article 39(4) stipulates the procedures under which the right to secession can 
come into effect, and it thus overrides the word ‗unconditional‘ (in Article 39/1) 
in relation to session. The political objectives of these provisions are articulated 
in Article 88 which provides that: 
1)  ―Guided by democratic principles, Government shall promote and 
support the People‘s self-rule at all levels‖.  
2) ―Government shall respect the identity of Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples. Accordingly, Government shall have the duty to strengthen ties 
of equality, unity and fraternity among them‖.  
The adverse impact of Article 39(1) of the FDRE Constitution relates to the 
perception it creates because it can be easily susceptible to political and 
economic elite capture thereby eroding beliefs and thoughts of multi-ethnic civic 
identity. Article 39(1) traces its roots to Joseph Stalin‘s views embodied in 
Article 72 of the USSR Constitution until the breakup of the Soviet Union 
during the early 1990s. It is to be noted that absence of such provision is not an 
absolute guarantee against attempts of secession (such as Biafra) and the actual 
occurrence of secession as in the case of South Sudan.  The adverse impact of 
the provision does not thus mainly lie in its potential to be effectively invoked 
(in the near future), but in the misperception which it creates and the sense of 
shared citizenship and civic fraternity that it can gradually erode thereby causing 
challenges in the pace of nation building, economic development, social well-
being and environmental sustainability.  
Karen A. Cerulo cites Disraeli‘s observations which states that ―[i]ndividuals 
may form communities, but institutions alone can create a nation‖, and she notes 
that ―[e]qually important are a nation's symbols, rituals, and traditions‖ which 
constitute a nation's identity.89 These elements in nation building (including the 
institutions of trust, inter-ethnic fraternity and attachment to the national flag) 
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are indeed crucial. This calls for addressing the tension between shared civic 
identity and the ‗secession‘ clause in Article 39(1) of the FDRE Constitution.  
It is thus high time to raise the question whether Ethiopia‘s Constitution –
which is currently the only constitution in the world that has a Stalinist 
provision (in the form of Article 39/1)– can (in light of Truth and Reason) be 
‗right‘ against the entire world.  If the breakup of the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, and ethnic clashes in Ethiopia are not adequate enough to show us 
the path to Truth, Reason and Critical Thinking in this regard, we as a nation-
state are too naïve to avoid institutional fragility (including justice sector 
institutions). Such oversight also negates the current trend toward sub-regional 
and regional integration in Africa via free trade areas and customs unions with 
the optimistic vision of Africa‘s ultimate political integration in 2063, i.e., a 
century from the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.  
10. Legal Arguments regarding the Emblem on Ethiopia’s Flag  
The clashes (on September 13th 2018, in Addis Ababa) over flags and emblems 
are incidences that indicate the need for clarity on the Ethiopian flag which 
represents Ethiopia‘s sovereignty. Attachment to a flag, inter alia, represents 
civic membership and commitment. Article 3 of the FDRE Constitution states 
the horizontal colours in the Ethiopian flag as ―green at the top, yellow in the 
middle, and red at the bottom‖ that have equal dimensions. It also states that the 
flag ―shall have a national emblem in the centre‖.   
Article 3(2) provides that ―the national emblem on the flag shall reflect the 
hope of the Nations, Nationalities, Peoples as well as religious communities of 
Ethiopia to live together in equality and unity‖. Article 3(3) recognizes the 
rights of members of the federation to have their respective flags determined by 
their respective legislatures. This provision does not, however, envisage flags of 
political parties. Of course, political parties have the right to design their 
emblems, but a flag that differs from the political party‘s emblem can be 
confused with flags that are only allowed at a country or regional state level.   
There are issues that evoke controversy regarding the mandatory use of the 
emblem at the centre of the Ethiopian flag and the blue colour that is used as its 
background. There have been emblems during the previous regimes. However, 
it has never been unlawful for the public to use flags without emblems, even 
though flags with emblems were hoisted in key public offices and at the flag 
posts of some government institutions.  
According to Article 3(1) of the FDRE Constitution, the national emblem 
shall be at the centre. This provision can imply the interpretation that the 
national emblem shall not go beyond the colour at the centre, i.e. the yellow 
colour.  For example, among Pan-African flags that use green, golden and red 
(inspired by the Ethiopian flag), Cameroon, Ghana and Senegal use stars as 
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emblems at the centre. However, the emblems use the colour at the centre as 
background, and they do not stretch to the upper and lower colours of the flag.  
One can interrogate the constitutionality of the Flag Proclamation No. 
654/2009 on two grounds. First, it introduces a fourth blue colour as 
background to the national emblem, and secondly, it violates the notion of 
‗centre‘ envisaged in the Constitution because it provides that the circumference 
of the blue colour is ―curved on the midpoint of the width of both the green and 
red colours‖.90  
Article 3(1) of the Constitution envisages only three colours (green, yellow 
and red) and the emblem at the centre should have used the yellow in the centre 
as its background, by using green and/or red for drawing the star and rays. It can 
thus be argued that Article 6 of the Flag Proclamation is unconstitutional 
because it introduces a fourth colour to the Ethiopian flag. The fourth colour 
was initially introduced by the Flag and Emblem Proclamation No. 16/1996. 
The Proclamation clearly considered the blue as a fourth colour, and gave it a 
numerical sequence under Article 4. The provision titled ―Meaning of the 
Colours of the Flag‖ reads: 
―The colours of the Flag shall represent the following meanings: 
1) the green for labour, fertility [ልምላሜ] and development; 
2) the yellow for hope, justice and equality; and 
3) the red for sacrifice and heroism towards the prevalence of freedom and 
equality.  
4) The circular blue background of the Emblem signifies peace.‖ 
The circular blue colour that serves as background does not add meaning 
because ‗peace‘ is inseparable from justice, freedom and equality that are 
already represented by the other colours. The blue colour also disrupts the 
horizontal equal dimensions stated in Article 3(1) of the Constitution. Even 
worse, the background blue colour (which had slightly touched the green and 
red colours under Proclamation No. 16/1996) was enlarged after the enactment 
of the Flag and Emblem (Amendment) Proclamation No. 48/1996 (so that it 
could extend to the midpoint of the green and red colours). This enlarged 
background is adopted in Proclamation No. 654/2009. One can thus argue that 
Proclamation No. 654/2009 is unconstitutional because, it unduly allows a 
fourth colour, and the blue circular background disturbs the horizontal 
alignment and equal dimensions of green, yellow and red (thereby reducing the 
area of the yellow colour in the flag which represents hope, justice and 
equality).    
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11. Land Tenure Security and the Need to Avoid Role Conflict 
in Municipalities 
The problem related to equity in the economy (social injustice) is one of the 
factors for public dissatisfaction. This is very relevant in justice system 
institution building and broad-based economic and social empowerment. It is 
awkward that Ethiopia (as a primarily rural smallholder farmer economy) turns 
a deaf-ear to the volumes of academic literature on rural and urban land tenure 
security that can enhance economic efficiency, social wellbeing and 
environmental sustainability. For example, the scheme of land readjustment91 
accommodates urban redevelopment or urban expansion without evicting urban 
or peri-urban landholders because the landholdings can be contributed as stock 
(share) in new investments to the mutual benefit of all parties, i.e. former 
landholders and investors.  
Analogous to Article 39(1) of the FDRE Constitution (highlighted in the 
preceding section), ‗government-ownership‘ of land in the Ethiopian land law 
regime is unique and contradicts with all legal regimes in the world. There is no 
land law throughout the world which states that land belongs to the 
‗government‘92 even though various countries consider land as state (or public) 
owned without, however, denying the tenure security of landholders. Even 
China, that has not yet set aside various communist party policies, recognizes 
the land use ownership rights of landholders (since 2007) while land ownership 
is in principle held by the state.93  In China, rights of landholders are 
transferable via sale, lease, or as stock contribution without the need for 
pretention and simulation. In Ethiopia, on the other hand, we are fully aware that 
a ‗house‘ will be demolished by a buyer, and we pretend as if it is the house and 
not the land that is being sold.   
Ethiopia‘s land regime is also inconsistent with the ‗land to the tiller‘ slogan 
of the student movement of the 1960s and early 1970s. This motto did not 
envisage a setting which de facto relegates landholders to the position of 
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disempowered tenants of the government without tenure security whenever the 
government invokes ‗public purpose‘94 even when it seeks to evict landholders 
and allocate their land to ‗investors‘.  
The proclamations that consider land as ‗government-owned‘ are 
unconstitutional because Article 40(3) of the FDRE Constitution confers land 
ownership on the state, nations, nationalities and peoples thereby implying joint 
ownership. At individual level, a rural or urban landholder (is an individual 
member of a nation, people, etc) and is, in effect, joint owner and not a mere 
holder who can be arbitrarily evicted. Analogous to an apartment in a 
condominium, an individual holder of urban or rural land can (under Article 
40/3 of the Constitution) be entitled to joint right in rem (right over the land), 
and exclusive right in rem  over the physical property on the land.  
The social movements that started at Ginchi in 2015 and the second wave of 
protests against evictions due to the new ‗master plan‘ of Addis Ababa were the 
immediate causes of the civil disobedience that eventually led to the political 
reforms that are underway. This injustice of land tenure insecurity at the 
grassroots indeed deserves due attention on both grounds of equity and 
economic efficiency.  Unfortunately, however, political parties, including the 
ruling party have not yet included the land tenure security agenda among their 
urgent concerns. Tenure security is related with the basic needs of people at the 
grassroots, i.e. daily engagement of citizens in meaningful economic activities 
and social services, decent meal, clean water, housing, health and education. 
Decent meal for most citizens at the grassroots, for example, is unimaginable in 
the absence of one of the core factors of production, i.e. stronger land tenure 
security which is a precondition for productivity, social wellbeing and 
environmental sustainability.   
Economic and political elites in predatory states benefit from resource 
capture in the context of grass-root disempowerment. In business as usual 
scenarios, municipalities throughout Ethiopia will continue to be land lease 
‗boutiques‘ rather than municipal service providers (including uninterrupted 
water and power supply) thereby entering into an apparent role conflict between 
revenue generation (by leasing out as much urban space as possible) which 
clearly contradicts with the proper conduct of their municipal services. For 
example, the level of deterioration in municipal services in Addis Ababa with 
regard to water supply shortages, power outages, gaps in waste management, 
etc., clearly show the impact of the role conflict. We should have been able to 
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evaluate the performance of municipalities based on their municipal functions 
rather than their annual revenue from land lease. This is another feature of 
Ethiopia‘s unique malpractice (as opposed to all municipalities in the world).   
A Municipality which is the custodian of a Master Plan and municipal 
functions cannot be entrusted with the opposite task of raising its lease-sale 
revenue through the sale of urban land through ‗lease‘.95 As the practice shows, 
cohorts of office holders in municipal land administrations face series of 
corruption charges, and again identical incidences of corruption and arrests 
repeat themselves in many parts of Ethiopia. Municipalities should thus be 
restricted to their conventional function of municipal services and the 
implementation of master plans; and another public authority not accountable to 
municipalities should be entrusted with land banking and acquisition based on 
master plans and with due respect to tenure security of landholders.  
12. The Need for Normative Gate Keeping against Predatory 
Statehood 
Although discontent and social movements have led to failed statehood in Libya 
and other countries, this has not been the case in Ethiopia –after three years of 
social movements since 2015– even though the risks of polarized fragmentation 
were graver. This antidote against failed statehood can only be sustained, inter 
alia, through rule of law which is, inter alia, characterized by public trust in all 
government organs, including the justice sector.   
The ruling party claimed to pursue democratic developmental statehood after 
the 2005 elections. On the contrary, however, Ethiopia‘s politico-economic 
realities ―were closer to predatory rather than developmental statehood because 
state intervention in democratic developmental states such as Botswana, targets 
at empowering (and not repressing and substituting) broad-based private 
sector‖.96   
A case in point regarding predatory acts in the Ethiopian context includes 
economic resource grabs by office holders under the façade of various front-
persons (who cannot explain their windfall ‗wealth‘).  The acts of corrupt office 
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holders and a significant portion of the economic elite also include contraband 
trade chains that have considerably displaced the taxpaying private sector. The 
endpoint of this chain is clearly visible in the magnitude of street vending in 
cities such as Addis Ababa.  Such corruption and claims of phony legitimacy 
(though elections) cannot thrive in settings where justice sector organs are 
empowered and independent.  Thus, interventions in the mandates and 
operations of justice sector institutions become inevitable in predatory states. 
As Eun Mee Kim observes, predatory states use their power ―for capricious 
extraction and wasteful consumption‖ and this ―diminishes private productive 
capacities rather than enhancing them‖ as a result of which welfare and growth 
suffer.97 Vaughan and Gebremichael also noted that developmental 
patrimonialism succeeds only when the pot (ማዕዴ) grows and ensures a 
―reasonably sustainable access to it‖, in the absence of which ―a transition 
economy of low productivity, poorly co-coordinated markets, opportunistic 
rents, unregulated entrepreneurialism has frequently led to non-developmental 
kleptocracy‖.98  
The economic policies in Ethiopia were indeed susceptible to predatory 
statehood which creates and nurtures elites of oligarchs rather than a broader 
middle class. While few individuals form the political stratum and economic 
elites usually become predators in such settings, the economy at large and the 
population are prey to their predators.  In the Ethiopian context, predatory 
interventions include rigidity against land reform because the political and 
economic elites have vested interest in land acquisitions in the guise of ‗land 
lease‘ and ‗investments‘.  Insecure landholding also meant a carrot and a stick 
tool in controlling voter behaviour and small-scale enterprise support schemes.  
Oligarchs ‗benefit‘ from reflexive ‗growth‘ in predatory states whose eclectic 
policies and decisions are characterized by whims and haphazard pursuits.  
Under such settings, elegant formulae of ‗economic growth‘, glittering power-
point presentations and fake reports (rather than the reality on the ground) 
prompt policy decisions. In the context of non-inclusive oligarchy, reflexive 
decisions have, inter alia, brought about waves of haphazard high-rise 
constructions in Addis Ababa and other cities, excessive foreign debt, currency 
printouts unmatched by the production of goods and services, imprudent 
projects, and levying of Value Added Tax (VAT) on basic goods including food 
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(to make up for excessive government expenditures). As Tekle-Birhan Gebre-
Michael duly observes:  
The infrastructure development through currency printing, foreign debt and 
foreign aid has little contribution to production, and has thus entailed 
inflation, fall in the exchange rate of Birr, foreign currency shortages, 
corruption and waste of resources.99 
The reversal of predatory statehood and reflexive ‗growth‘ calls for rule of 
law and substantial reform of justice sector institutions (including the land law 
regime). As the justice sector operates within the economic, social and political 
realities of Ethiopia, any positive development in these sectors toward 
sustainable development and democratization inevitably facilitates justice sector 
reform owing to their dialectical and bi-directional causal relationship.  
Concluding Remarks 
Justice system reform and laws (that constitute rational expressions of the 
‗general will‘ rather than a political party manifesto) are among the factors that 
determine the pace of Ethiopia‘s overall institutional development. Challenges 
such as the themes discussed in the preceding sections, i.e. institutional 
discontinuity, ethnic politics and the land law regime illustrate root causes of 
problems that render justice system reform difficult.  
It is indeed commendable that the revision of Ethiopia‘s laws in areas such as 
anti-terrorism and civil societies is given due attention. There are also other 
areas that need due focus in addition to the ones that have received priority. 
They include a legal regime on stock market (in the absence of which pledges of 
privatization of Ethio-telecom, Ethiopian Airlines, Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia, etc would merely entrench oligarchy), due attention to quality and 
standards in education, language policy and Population-Health-Environment 
(PHE) nexus policy. It is to be noted that the quality and standards of education 
and due attention to value systems and moral character (such as work ethic) are 
foundations for every pursuit in nation building, sustainable development, social 
wellbeing and progress. 
Other areas that call for reforms include meritocratic (as opposed to political 
party-affiliated) assignments in the public service and the levels of remuneration 
(including the justice sector), the pace of march toward multi-ethnic political 
party programs, caveats against laissez faire hedonism (such as the tchat/khat 
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wave), autonomy of the National Bank of Ethiopia (so that monetary policy 
including the volume of paper money in circulation can be determined by NBE 
with due professionalism and independence), the need for transferring 
constitutional interpretation to courts, reinstatement of shares in private banks 
that were owned by the diaspora,100 and many others which have been issues of 
discourse in various research works. These issues can be incrementally and 
progressively addressed because they have been themes of academic discourse.  
There is no dearth of literature with regard to these and many other pertinent 
issues as long as prime attention is given to critical inquiry, Truth and Reason.  
As one of the external assessors of this article duly observed: 
The question of ‘who owns and supports justice system reform initiatives in 
Ethiopia’ is crucial. Is it the government on top? or, justice sector 
institutions, the general public, donors, the civil society including the legal 
profession? or all of these together? This is a critical question to ask while 
addressing the question as to why reforms have not been effective or 
sustainable. Some researches show that countries can be grouped into three 
when their legal and judicial reforms are assessed: (i) those where the 
politicians, legal professionals and the public support reforms, (ii) those 
where politicians support reforms, but lawyers, the public and other law 
enforcement organs do not; and (iii) those where only the legal professions 
want reforms but not the politicians. Only reforms of the first category can 
attain their objectives. ..101 
The participation of law professionals in the law reform process and the level 
of political will are commendable with regard to the efforts and achievements of 
the Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council (highlighted in Section 2.1). 
However, this cannot be sustainable unless the activities, task processes and 
achievements of the Council are well-documented and institutionalized thereby 
leading to entities such as Law Reform Commission (or Law Commission) with 
a view to sustaining and enhancing institutional memory, institutional continuity, 
professionalism and public engagement in law reform.  
Moreover, mere expression of JLRTI‘s mandate under Proclamation No. 
1071/2018 cannot ensure its effective performance in the absence of the legal 
profession‘s active engagement. The construction of premises to JLRTI at the 
peripheral outskirts of Addis Ababa –that are not easily accessible– does not 
facilitate such integrated engagements. A few offices at a proximate location 
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that are convenient to JLRTI staff and easily accessible to the legal profession 
are far better than buildings and a spacious compound in the outskirts of the city 
that require hours of transport –while such precious time could be devoted to 
effective research. The newly constructed premises can thus be assigned to 
Justice Organ Professionals Training Centre (JOPTC) which can focus on 
judicial training under the Federal Supreme Court. This author argues that 
JOPTC (whose function is to, inter alia, conduct judicial training) cannot be part 
of JLRTI as the latter is under the Attorney General‘s Office in accordance with 
Proclamation No. 1097/2018.  
The way forward requires political will in addressing the root causes for the 
regression of Ethiopia‘s justice system, and it further calls for joint efforts of all 
stakeholders including the legal profession and the public. In the course of 
pragmatic initiatives and pursuits, the unattained elements among the 2002 and 
2005 justice system reform recommendations can indeed be utilized (with some 
updating by the respective institutions as shown in Section 2.2) because they are 
a fortiori relevant today than they were during their formulation.  
As Hodgson notes, institutions are ―systems of established and prevalent 
social rules that structure social interactions‖.102 These systems envisage a blend 
of organic and consciously formulated norms, structures and modes of operation. 
Reflexive and haphazard institutional reforms cannot thus succeed since 
institution building (including justice system reform) envisages roadmap clarity 
and because a wrong path does not lead to intended destinations.  
However, policy roadmaps in Ethiopia have been blurred and inconsistent. A 
query that arises is the extent to which policies are informed by particular tracks 
in the constitutional democracy landscape from social democracy to liberal 
market economy (with due caveat against extremist neo-liberal de-regulation).103 
To borrow some words from Lewis Caroll‘s famous quote, ―[if we] don't know 
where [we] are going, any road will get [us] there.‖104 In the context of the 
justice sector, piecemeal and reflexive trial and error, which is not based on a 
proactive strategic roadmap (with due synergy among justice sector institutions) 
would only pull the justice system to the unknown, and in effect, to further 
regression.                                                                                                             ■ 
                                           
102
 Geoffrey M. Hodgson (2006). ―What are Institutions?‖ Journal of Economic 
Issues, 40(1), p. 2. 
103
 The words ‗neo-liberal‘ and ‗developmental state‘ were usually misdefined in official 
statements since 2005/2006.  Criticisms against predatory features of the ruling party‘s 
interventions were unduly labelled as ‗neo-liberal‘.  However, neo-liberalism refers to 
extreme de-regulatory prescriptions such as the ‗Washington Consensus‘ of the late 
1980s.   
104
 ―If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there.‖  (Charles 
Lutwidge Dodgson, 1832-1898 , known by his pen name Lewis Caroll). 
